In addition, it added to its observations that the minimum number of judges to sit to hear cases concerning essential points of law as regards the interpretation of the Constitution or to hear a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 143 should be five. The Court relied on Pankajakshi v Chandrika, (2016) 6 SCC 157, which concluded that the provisions of the Punjab Courts Act 1918, which allowed for a second due remedy, were effective despite the restrictive conditions subsequently introduced by the amendment of Article 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1976. Therefore, the obligation to formulate a question of substantive law was no longer a sine qua non condition for that court to rule on a second regular remedy The Karnataka Supreme Court held that the entire implementation of transfer pricing adjustments on the basis of a comparability analysis is a matter of estimation. The court, which is the final instance for establishing the facts, decides on transfer pricing issues on the basis of the relevant facts/elements presented. In that regard, the Court of Justice held that, in the Findings of the General Court, the taxable person must be `perverse` in order to raise an `essential question of law`. Supreme Court: The Bank of L. 3 judges. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ, held that the High Court is not required to make substantive points of law if it finds no error in the findings of the First Court of Appeal. In this case, the respondent brought an action before the Trial Court for a mandatory injunction to remove the temporary sheet metal sheds and other obstacles allegedly raised by the appellant (defendant in the action) on land that was extensive public land on the west side of the appellant`s house. The disputed land was located in an area called Madhu Settlement, which was different from Sharma Settlement, where the defendants` and plaintiffs` home was located.

The obstacles on this property caused an obstacle to the entry and exit of the defendant (plaintiff in the lawsuit) into his home. The Court of First Instance issued an injunction against the defendant. The complainant challenged the above-mentioned decision before the District Judge, who dismissed his appeal. Subsequently, this appeal was filed, and it was dismissed in 2010 by a coordinating bank of that court, which concluded that the plaintiff-defendant was not allowed to enter and leave his house across the impugned street, so that the lower courts` finding was overturned to that extent. However, the decree of the following courts ordering the plaintiff-defendant to remove the interference from the disputed road was upheld. Aggrieved by this decision, the defendant filed an application for special leave (SLP) with the Supreme Court, and the case was referred to that court and instructed to see if a point of substantive law had arisen in the second appeal, and then to hear the parties again. The High Court held that this application could be granted in the light of the conclusion that, once the non-payment of rent had been established, the Court had no choice but to issue an order on the ground provided for in section 12(1)(a) of the 1961 Act, but that no point of substantive law had been established, that action was dismissed. [Vasudev v. Bhagwanti Bai, 2019 SCC OnLine MP 687, Decision 11-04-2019] The Court held that a comparative interpretation of p. 100 and Order in Council 43 R.

1(u) of the CPC that S. 100 CPC makes it very clear that the High Court would appeal an appeal and an order in council on a second remedy if the High Court is satisfied that the case relates to a substantive point of law. It also clarified that the S. Article 100(3) again states that the notice of appeal must contain separately the point of law at issue and, under Subsection 4, the High Court must also ensure that it is an essential point of law, while Order in Council 43, Rule 1(u) CPC is silent on the question of the existence and wording of a substantive point of law. A second vocation, or any appeal, by the way, is not a matter of law. The right of appeal is enshrined in law. A second appeal concerns only one point of essential law. If the law grants a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot extend the scope of the remedy. It was not open to the defendant-plaintiff to reverse the facts again or to ask the High Court to reanalyze or evaluate the evidence in a second appeal.

Article 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908, as amended, limits the right to a second remedy only to cases relating to a point of substantive law. The existence of an essential point of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908. The panel, composed of Judges Navin Sinha and Indira Banerjee, took note of the main legal issues raised in this case and noted that, with all due respect to the High Court, neither of the two questions formulated by the High Court is a question of law, let alone an essential question of law. In the High Court, there was no controversy as to the legal interpretation or effect of a document or about a misapplication of a legal principle, in the interpretation of a document or in any other way that might have led to a point of law. There was no contentious issue before the High Court that was not covered by firm principles of law and/or precedents. The Court held that, to be essential, a question of law must be debatable, must not first be governed by the law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a substantial influence on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it if it is answered in any way. In order to be a question of law, which is the case, it must first be based on the pleadings, and the question should arise on the basis of the substantiated findings of fact reached by the courts of fact and it must be necessary to decide this point of law for a fair and appropriate decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time in the High Court is not an issue involved in the case unless it gets to the root of the case, she added. The principles for deciding when a question of law becomes an essential point of law were established by a constitutional bank of that court in [Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. vs Century Spg. & Mfg.

Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314], where the Supreme Court ruled: The correct test for determining whether a point of law raised in the case is essential would be, in our view, whether it is of importance to the general public or whether it directly and significantly affects the rights of the parties and, if so, whether it is an open question in the sense that: it will not be definitively decided by this Court or by the Privy. The Council or through the Federal Supreme Court or is not free of difficulties or calls for the discussion of other points of view. If the question is decided by the highest court, or if the general principles to be applied in deciding the question have been well clarified and it is simply a question of the application of those principles, or if the plea raised is manifestly absurd, the question would not constitute an essential question of law. In Hero [Vinoth v Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 5452], the Supreme Court referred to Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons (loc. cit.) and other judgments and summarized the criteria for determining whether a particular set of legal issues were mere legal issues or substantive legal issues. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of the Court of Justice in hero Vinoth (loc. cit.) are set out below: 21. The term essential legal question as set out in Article 100 of the amended CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as a qualifying legal question, means to be substantial, substantial, real, of good value, important or substantial. It must be understood as something that is contrary to technique, without substance or consequence or exclusively academic.

However, it is clear that the legislator has chosen not to limit the scope of the essential point of law by indicating words of general importance, as has been done in many other provisions such as Article 109 of the Code or Article 133, paragraph 1, point (a), of the Constitution. .